There are a number of ways to categorize IEDs. Perhaps one of the better ways is to define them by the mode by which they are initiated. Using this categorization, we can see the following:. Clearly there are many variations within each of these categories, but generally almost all IEDs fall within these three main areas. Recent developments have not essentially changed these fundamentals. Typically, IEDs have four key components: a main charge of explosives, an explosive initiator a small amount of energetic explosives , a switching mechanism and a container of some sort.
Most developments in IED design and construction involve one or more of these. Perpetrators of IED attacks are faced with a range of targets and naturally those targets may take measures to improve their protection in the event of an attack.
This naturally leads to the perpetrator considering ways in which to amplify the effect of the explosive component in order to overcome those defensive measures.
At the simplest level this might simply be the use of larger quantities of explosives. Over the last few years we have seen larger and larger VBIEDs in a variety of countries around the world as security protocols, using things such as road blocks, keep VBIEDs further from their targets.
A second development is the use of a more sophisticated explosive component design. When faced with armored targets some terrorist groups have used the physics of explosive component design to develop the design of the warhead to create a more penetrative effect, using — for instance — shaped charges.
Shaped charges come in a variety of configurations, from high angle cones to dishes, all of which are deformed by the complex transition of the explosive blast wave into a range of penetrative effects. These effects can be further developed by the use of a range of different metals, which deform in different ways. Perpetrators of IED attacks do not necessarily have access to military explosives.
The lessons learned here will be sent to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, as well other Department of Defense training operations and forward deployed missions where Soldiers' lives depend on it.
Photo Credit: U. Army Spc. Soldiers and Marines had taken it upon themselves to add so-called Hillbilly armor to their vehicles or pile sandbags on the floorboards. The Pentagon initially rushed kits to retrofit Humvees with better protection in and But the trucks remained vulnerable because of their "flat bottom, low weight, low ground clearance and aluminum body," a Pentagon inspector general report found.
In the meantime, more than 1, U. The Pentagon says the trucks, featuring heavy armor and V-shaped hulls for deflecting blasts, saved thousands of lives. Today in the twilight of American involvement in Afghanistan, commanders are cutting the chance of death by IED even further. Missions to clear roads, among the last going "outside the wire," are pulling back to paved highways where burying bombs is harder.
Clearance convoys are shadowed by Apache attack helicopters. Night missions, peripheral lights ablaze, look like roving football stadiums.
The trucks are wrapped in netting that can deflect rocket-propelled grenades. Inside, soldiers wearing helmets, body armor, protective goggles and fortified underwear sit on shock-absorbing seats and track potential IED hot spots on computer screens. From inside their armored vehicles, they can remotely inspect and probe suspicious ground with long metal arms. They can deploy robots big and small.
They have electronic jammers, ground-penetrating radar and giant IED-uncovering rakes. Crane says about the many inventions provided to them.
An Obama administration eager to put the IED chapter behind it has pledged to avoid long-term operations where the bombs are a threat. Four days earlier, another Green Beret — Staff Sgt. Afghan civilians and troops are now suffering the brunt of IED attacks. They target soldiers and civilians alike. NATO must remain prepared to counter IEDs in any land or maritime operation involving asymmetrical threats, in which force protection will remain a paramount priority.
Neutralisation of IED may be the most visible part of the C-IED effort but in order for it to be truly effective, it must be preceded by efforts to indentify and disrupt the networks emplacing, building and procuring IEDs.
The Alliance focuses on reducing the frequency and severity of IED attacks, while also attacking the networks AtN that facilitate them. Understanding the various threat networks at the tactical to strategic levels is vital to success in current and future operations where battle lines are no longer linear.
It covers all levels of C-IED, from the strategic to the tactical. It is built around several different areas, including information-sharing, closer cooperation with other international organisations and law enforcement agencies. In this context, the use of biometric information is seen as a key element in countering threat anonymity.
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